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ABSTRACT 
 
Shannon A. S. Roberson (Master of Arts in English Language and Literature) 
From Small Beginnings to Large-Scale Harm: On Demagoguery and Misogyny in the Classroom 
and Writing Center 
Directed by Caddie Alford 
 
 My project is grounded in the rhetorical concept of aretê—excellence or virtue—as it 
relates to education and educational spaces within demagogic and misogynist cultural forces. 
The problems of demagoguery and misogyny stem from small-scale perpetuation of agonistic 
norms that go unaddressed in U.S. culture, a culture that is deeply identity-driven. These forces 
persist on social media platforms and within patriarchal systems of education.  
For my project, I suggest rhetorical media literacy education of small-scale demagoguery 
moments on social media as a way to bring awareness to larger-scale events. On a micro-scale, 
social media influencers cultivate behaviors that mimic demagogic norms: charismatic 
leadership, propagation of in-group/out-group binaries, and personalized echo chambers. 
Bringing awareness to how influencers function and use social media to their benefit empowers 
consumers to understand when or if someone is acting demagogically. Empowerment is a way to 
support students as they achieve pedagogical aretê. 
 To address misogyny, I turn to the university writing center space to demonstrate how 
feminist rhetorical pedagogy can and do inhabit patriarchal academic systems. Writing centers 
act as peripheral academic spaces on university campuses while stull supporting a student’s quest 
for aretê. Writing consultants use rhetorical listening practices to bring the invisible steps of the 
writing process to light during consultations. In a writing center, rhetorical listening is an act of 
feminist pedagogy that promotes socially engaged collaboration. Arming students with an 
understanding of their personal writing style, voice, and process fosters ownership of their ideas, 
combating misogynist and patriarchal constraints and paving the way for pedagogical aretê. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose 
arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. 
We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take 
a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though 
there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument— attack, defense, counterattack, 
etc. — reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it 
structures the actions we perform in arguing.” 
— George Lakoff and Mark Johnson Metaphors We Live By 4 
 
How we talk about argument is how we understand the concept of argument. In the quote 
above, Lakoff and Johnson reveal the framework in which argument lives—a metaphor of war 
(4). In argument we attack or defend, we have strong or weak points, we win or lose. Over time, 
the refrain “argument is war” has become ingrained in the way we think about verbal debate. 
More than that, it simply is how we argue in most contexts, whether the arguments are done 
publicly or privately. Lakoff and Johnson ask us to imagine a culture in which argumentative 
encounters were done not verbally, but performed as a dance, a physical performance wherein 
aesthetics determined a successful outcome (5). We would not see this event as an argument; 
rather, we would see it as something completely different because it lacks the aspect of verbal 
battle that we expect from argumentation. The roots of how we talk about and perceive argument 
originate in ancient Greece, from a time when public, physical agonism determined the moral 
virtue of the young men who sought to achieve aretȇ.  
The ancient Greek concept of aretȇ is associated with the “goodness, courage, and 
prowess of a warrior” (Hawhee 187). The warrior—the person who is brave, strong, godlike, 
honorable, and possibly destined to die in battle—was the epitome of virtuosity. Aretȇ, known as 
virtue or “excellence in moral conduct,” gained its original expression in Homer’s poetic legend, 
the Iliad (Coogan 74). Achilles, trained under the wise centaur Chiron and counseled further by 
Phoenix, achieves aretȇ by learning virtuous rules of combat and social conduct. Becoming 
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virtuous required being dedicated and loyal through service to the state. Counseling, tutelage, 
and training are a form of pedagogy from which young noblemen could achieve aretȇ by 
committing to the quest under the guidance of an elder exemplar. Performing heroic acts for the 
good of the state was grounded in Sparta’s militaristic society, in contrast to Athenian scribal 
culture where ancient Greek philosophy and rhetoric were evolving with a preference toward 
intellectual character. By emphasizing intellect and mentorship, rhetorical pedagogy formally 
began to take root in Athenian culture through Socratic teachings and dialogues, as documented 
and represented by Plato. Both scribal and militaristic cultures, however, understood aretȇ as a 
goal: to be successful both in war for the state and in debate for the self were achievements of the 
highest moral virtue and excellence.  
Aretȇ occurs by dedicating oneself to the quest—that is, aretȇ is achieved through a 
journey, not as an end alone. Questing is a “continual pursuit of virtuosity” (Hawhee 192). What 
matters for aretȇ “is not the victory per se but rather the hunt for the victory” (192). Aretȇ is not 
something that someone can just stumble upon or luck into.  Aretȇ takes dedication and training 
from a mentor or tutor. Once a student is able to imitate or reproduce the skill/work of their 
exemplar, the moment is marked as the achievement of aretȇ.  The concept and practice of Aretȇ 
has persisted through the ages and exists even today in modern American athletic and rhetorical 
pursuits. While these two broad disciplines take different routes to achieve excellence, both 
value the quest/training. 
Though the idea of the contest is commonly associated with combative athleticism, 
rhetoric and athletics share similar methodologies when it comes to agonistic and competitive 
encounters. Athletic aretȇ and rhetorical aretȇ share a common metaphor and vocabulary, much 
like Lakoff and Johnson describe above. During the Olympic Games of ancient Greece, 
3 
 
wrestling garnered attention so much so that rhetors like Gorgias started to use the language of 
wrestling to display the risk and cleverness of oratory (Hawhee 201). In his speech at the 
Olympic Games, Gorgias explained that 
a contest (agônisma) such as we have requires double excellence (dittôn areiôn): daring 
(tolmês) and skill (sophia), daring is needed to withstand danger, and skill to understand 
how to trip the opponent (pligma). For surely speech, like the summons at the Olympic 
Games, calls the willing but crowns the capable (DK 82.B.8 in O’Regan 13). 
 
An opponent can be tripped up in both athletics and speech; likewise, both require skill, cunning, 
and flexibility to achieve excellence. Skill at speaking makes one strong in verbal struggle or 
contest, but skill doesn’t form or manifest in an asocial vacuum—it affects other people. To 
achieve excellence, aretȇ has an implied ability to “help friends and harm enemies” (O’Regan 
12). In athletic aretȇ, this implication is clear—physical valor of a knight was glorified for the 
good of the state (friends) in opposition to those who wish to harm the state (enemies). But in 
rhetorical aretȇ, values of persuasion point to similar agonistic technologies: “the tongue 
replaces the hand; the word, the sword; powerful speaking, physical might” (13). The metaphor 
of argument thus comes to life.  
 The legacy of agonist verbal encounters persists today—perhaps nowhere so urgently as 
with demagogic and patriarchal dynamics. With demagoguery, the rhetorical verbal violence is 
for the good of the individual—discourse informed by demagogic conditions enact harm against 
those who disagree. Similarly, misogyny works in favor of the individual by subordinating and 
punishing an Other. And, of course, these two strains of agonism are both amplified and 
sustained by digital forms of communication. As an educator, I am interested in exploring how 
pedagogical practices can support questing for aretȇ within the modern agonistic encounters 
dictated by demagogic and patriarchal systems. How can educators enable 21st century students 
to achieve personal excellence in a divisive digital era? How can educators or tutors bridge the 
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gap between feminist pedagogies and a misogynist, patriarchal academy? Agonistic 
communication is weaponized in the political reports circulating on social media platforms, in 
the identity policing on Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit feeds, and even in campus spaces where 
Others are further marginalized. My project interrogates these micro-aggressions and routine 
communicative habits to demonstrate that these small-scale manifestations of agonism can feed 
into dominant cultural norms (demagoguery, misogyny). I aim to support disrupting these norms 
by reframing contemporary educational practices as quests for aretȇ, all of which, I argue, must 
be responsive to our networked age. 
In Chapter One, I begin with an example of large-scale demagoguery by turning to tweets 
Donald Trump posted during his 2016 election campaign. Trump uses Twitter to incite his 
prolific, and often violent, base of supporters for personal gain—notably, at the expense of 
someone else. Trump’s large-scale demagoguery, that is, his national and international platform 
as president of the United States, lends credence to Lakoff and Johnson’s suggestion that the 
“argument is war” metaphor structures actual argumentation. His posts resulted in physical 
threats and verbal attacks on a private citizen, with no remorse or acknowledgment from Trump 
himself. His lack of mediation between an offensive, threatening base and a private American 
citizen conveyed implicit support for those who choose to act on his behalf. Trump’s public 
(mis)behavior reinspired a call to action from advocates for more civic-minded media literacy 
education.  
I take up that call for media literacy and extend it by suggesting that while the Virginia 
Standards of Learning (SOLs) lay out a pathway for media literacy pedagogy, what is really 
needed is a rhetorical media literacy pedagogy. The harm that can lead to large-scale forms of 
demagoguery stem from smaller interactions that normalize such behavior. What we consider 
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normal behavior on social media may actually be more insidious, inciting the same large-scale 
forms of demagoguery that worked to elect Trump in 2016. Therefore, in this chapter I turn to 
the dynamic between social media influencers and the networks they cultivate. Our students 
navigate this dynamic every day. Every day they maneuver through small-scale forms of 
demagoguery on social media: influencers utilize  demagoguery’s rule of “identity as logic” to 
create an “us” versus a “them” (Roberts-Miller Democracy 7).  To illustrate this dynamic, I 
analyze the Fyre Festival’s social media campaign, which demonstrates the extent to which 
social group membership has become a persuasive and alluring appeal at the cost of all else. Of 
course, social media influence is an issue that extends beyond the Instagram platform to all social 
networking media. To advocate for a rhetorical media literacy pedagogy, I use examples of 
small-scale demagoguery to instruct and scaffold understanding of larger-form persuasive forces, 
all of which impede a student’s journey toward excellence. 
In Chapter Two, I continue interrogating agonism’s legacy by addressing the ongoing 
exigencies of patriarchal and misogynistic forms of violence that work to ignore and stifle Other 
and feminine acts of rhetorical discourse. I begin the chapter with a look into Hillary Clinton’s 
style of campaigning during the 2016 election. Her approach was noticeably different from that 
of her opponent because she employed feminine rhetorical listening during her town hall 
meetings and other interactions with constituents. The public saw Clinton’s approach as 
dramatically different than the normalized masculine approach to which they were accustomed. 
The perception of her campaign was wrought with misogyny and misogynist expectations 
because she was steadfast in her feminist approach.  
From Clinton’s campaign, I delve into a smaller-scale patriarchal hierarchical system. 
One such system of patriarchal control is the academy wherein standard language ideology (SLI) 
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has persisted as the normal expectation for academic writing and student voice. SLI prevents 
successful journeys towards aretê for students who are marginalized by patriarchal systems 
within higher education.  While SLI may support one type of student’s journey towards aretȇ, 
marginalized Othered students are left in the wake of a patriarchal system that suggests their 
voice is a problem that must be fixed. Misogyny and racism operate as ways of policing Others 
in a patriarchal system that relies on maintaining the status quo. To address this legacy of 
agonism, I claim that the writing center can teach us forms of rhetorical listening and mentoring 
that are feminist in nature. My analysis suggests that writing center pedagogy invites a disruption 
of the confines of a patriarchal system by fostering a contact zone of mutual learning between 
consultant and student.  
The severe problems of demagoguery and misogyny stem from small-scale perpetuations 
of agonistic norms that go unaddressed. I extend the work of rhetorical scholar Patricia Roberts-
Miller’s work on political demagoguery to that of social media influencers and their cultivation 
of micro-scale demagogic norms. I continue Cheryl Glenn’s feminist scholarship about feminine 
pedagogical practices to examine how peripheral academic spaces (writing centers) enable 
student voices. By using this scholarship, my project argues that educators and tutors can address 
the spread of cultural norms that cause large-scale harm by thinking of pedagogy in terms of 
aretê for the digital age. Classrooms and writing centers are sites for rhetorical aretê—moral 
virtue and excellence in the form of social virtuosity for an agonist, digital age.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Demagoguery and Rhetorical Media Literacy Pedagogy 
 On October 12, 2015, before Donald Trump was the official Republican candidate for the 
2016 United States Presidential election, he attended a political forum in New Hampshire where 
18-year-old college student, Lauren Batchelder, told him that she didn’t think he was “a friend to 
women” (Johnson). From what we know of Trump’s online behavior during his tenure as 
president, it’s not surprising that the morning following the forum he responded to Batchelder on 
his Twitter account. By January 2016, the New York Times found that one in eight posts on 
Twitter from Trump “was a personal insult of some kind” (Lee & Quealy). His tweet at 7:39am 
on October 13 referred to Batchelder as an “arrogant young woman” and, later at 11:52am, a 
second post accused her of being “a ‘plant’ [for Jeb Bush’s campaign] during [his] speech” 
(@realDonaldTrump). During the interaction between  
 
Figure 1. Donald Trump tweets 
Batchelder and Trump, she said, “So, maybe I’m wrong, maybe you can prove me wrong, but I 
don’t think you’re a friend to women” (Johnson). Trump responded, saying he loves, respects, 
and cherishes women, to which Batchelder explained what she meant: “If you become president, 
will a woman make the same as a man, and do I get to choose what I do with my body?” 
(Johnson). “You’re going to make the same if you do as good of a job,” Trump replied, “and I 
happen to be pro-life, okay?” (Johnson). This exchange generated media coverage online, which 
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lead to Trump’s combative tweets the next morning. Insulting private citizens functions as 
weaponized communication—a type of communication that does “not seek to persuade, which 
requires consent and mutual openness to persuasion, but to force compliance, which is 
acquiescence” (Mercieca 270). Rhetorician Jennifer Mercieca calls this form of communication 
“weaponized” because it is a form of violence; in this case, Trump’s tweets directly led to 
personal threats of violence. 
 Mercieca suggests we think of weaponized communication as the widespread use of ad 
baculum: a fallacious appeal to threats of force or intimidation that is especially dangerous when 
used by a national political leader (271). Trump used his frustration with Republican primary 
candidate Jeb Bush as a red herring for Batchelder’s questions, inciting his fan base to go after 
Batchelder personally because of her differing political views. What followed were vicious, 
salacious messages from Trump supporters to Batchelder’s personal social media accounts. 
Trolls commented on her physical appearance, called her names, and threatened rape and other 
physical violence via written direct messages, public posts on her Twitter and Facebook pages, 
and the creation of memes in her likeness. People stalked her online, found out what university 
she was attending, and even her university and home addresses. Her physical and mental safety 
were threatened for months after Trump’s tweets were posted. She did not comment publicly 
about the incident until over a year later in a Washington Post interview on December 8, 2016 
after Trump’s presidential victory.  
In the aftermath of the shocking 2016 Presidential election, those who opposed Trump’s 
election called for more civic engagement and education as a reaction to Trump’s demagogic 
behavior. Rhetorician Patricia Roberts-Miller defines a demagogue as usually a “political leader 
who seeks support by appealing to the desires and prejudices of ordinary people rather than by 
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using rational argument” (2). Trump’s insulting tweets about Batchelder appealed to a base of his 
supporters who routinely gaslight and scapegoat women online as a form of anonymous trolling. 
These trolls amp Trump’s message and add to his visibility and salience. When online trolls 
attack a woman based on her physical appearance and threaten violence, they are succumbing to 
identity-driven discourse that in turn exacerbates a demagogue’s message. 
The large-scale demagoguery Trump exhibits—and that which we collectively associate 
with notorious modern demagogues like Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini who similarly incited 
passion from their political base—are big, loud examples of how demagoguery works in an 
identity-driven culture. But large-scale demagoguery is only possible when smaller-scale identity 
biases become baked into national and even political discourse. Demagoguery does not have to 
be political, just as weaponized communication does not always have to mean threats of physical 
violence—both can be local, nuanced, and even banal. Rather than thinking of demagoguery in 
terms of the traditional demagogue figure, Roberts-Miller underscores that demagoguery should 
“be thought of as a way of participating in public discourse and decision making—a way that can 
become the norm in a culture that is profoundly identity-driven” (2). The small-scale 
demagoguery that occurs on a daily basis can normalize identity allegiance to a degree that 
makes large-scale, grievously consequential demagoguery possible. Rhetorician Collin Gifford 
Brooke confirms that “it should therefore serve as no surprise that a wide-spread call for 
education has been a persistent theme” since the 2016 election, but this call is not unique in a 
time of desperation and upset (123). Demagoguery is not a new concept—it’s ancient.1 Thanks to 
the modern digital revolution, however, it is easier than ever to track the increasing appeal of 
identity through social media content and interactive behaviors.  
 
1 Athenian general during the Peloponnesian war, Cleon from the 430s B.C. was documented by historian 
Thucydides and playwright Aristophanes as a warmongering demagogue.   
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This chapter argues that the increasing appeal of demagoguery necessitates a specifically 
rhetorical media literacy education in order to expose high school and college students to small-
scale demagoguery. The studies of persuasion, media influence, demagoguery, and opinions in 
terms of habitual, identity-driven social media practices are vital for thriving in an ever-
expanding, more aware digital citizenry.  
 
Media Influence and Demagoguery on Social Media 
In late 2016, rumblings of a music festival began circulating on social media platforms 
that brought influencer culture to the forefront of media literacy conversations. On December 12, 
2016, at 5pm., sixty-three influencers posted an orange square to their social media accounts to 
endorse the Fyre Music Festival. For people who followed many of these influencers, their 
Instagram feeds were peppered with strange orange tiles, with minimal insight into what they 
meant. One of the most followed influencers, socialite and model Bella  
 
Figure 2. Bella Hadid Instagram post 
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Hadid, wrote, “CANT wait for #FyreFestival Coming soon www.fyrefestival.com” alongside the 
orange tile (Hadid). This was a paid advertisement from Fyre promoters through Hadid, a 
popular Instagram influencer with millions of followers. My project is not interested in Fyre 
Festival because it failed as a music event (the people who attended the event were stranded in 
the Bahamas without food, lodging, or transportation, and the organizers of the event exploited 
Bahamians for unpaid labor and service, etc). Rather, my project is interested in Fyre Festival’s 
media advertising campaign as an example of small-scale demagoguery to anchor pedagogical 
rhetorical media literacy. Demagoguery stems from beliefs and perceptions rooted in identity, 
and social media platforms provide the ideal space to cultivate an identity-driven echo chamber. 
Fyre Festival’s social media campaign leveraged influencers’ charismatic leadership on 
Instagram, in effect making them small-scale demagogues. 
Social media influencers are therefore purveyors of persuasion. Close reading of the 
failed Fyre Festival demonstrates how influencers, no matter how innocuous the product, operate 
politically as small-scale demagogues. We traditionally think of demagoguery in terms of the 
classic political figurehead persuading the masses—one person standing before thousands to 
enact an agenda—but this is not typical of the kind of modern, small-scale demagoguery our 
students negotiate every day. Social media platforms are the primary source for how people 
consume both entertainment and news, how people interact, influence, and share with others. I 
bring social media into the political conversation of demagoguery because social media use and 
activity has entered the realm of the political. Social media use, predominantly, is political. The 
Pew Research Center published data in 2018 showing two-thirds (68%) of Americans get their 
news from social media platforms. The center cited “convenience” as the most commonly 
mentioned benefit for social media use (“News Use” Shearer). When 68% of us get our news 
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from social media, these social media platforms and influencers with millions of followers are 
complicit in politics through forms of demagoguery.  
To understand the impact of social media demagoguery, one must understand the 
numbers because likes, followers, and impressions online are the currency of social membership. 
Fyre Festival garnered over 300 million impressions online within 24 hours and 8,000 tickets 
were sold by the date of the event thanks to the high-profile influencers who posted the orange 
tile to their Instagram accounts (Bilton). The tickets, which did not include airfare, sold from 
$500 to $1500, with VIP packages promising airfare and luxury tent accommodations for 
$12,000 (Bilton). But none of the grand plans that Fyre promised were delivered: no luxury 
accommodations, not enough food, no musicians were in attendance, and the infrastructure for 
the event (toilets, lodgings) was incomplete. At the time of sale, in fact, there were no 
photographs of the promised luxury accommodations on the website, just vague sketches—literal 
blueprints—with lists of potential amenities. Influencers, however, were paid no less than 
$20,000 each for one orange tile post. Their following simply did not ask questions about the 
logistics before buying tickets.2 The promoters for the event relied on the cultivated relationship 
between influencer and audience to produce actual consumptive revenue for the event.  
Suspicion that is usually associated with someone who sells a product is bypassed in an 
influencer-follower relationship, shirking the traditional roles between rhetor and audience. 
Rhetorician Carolyn Miller explains how traditionally, the relationship between rhetor and 
audience is adversarial—that is, trust is not implicit (22). A rhetor succeeds when an audience is 
persuaded, but audiences are not easily won over in the traditional context of rhetor speaking 
 
2 Kendall Jenner, the most followed influencer of the group, collected a $250,000 fee for making her post about a 
month after the original sea of orange tiles. 
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before an audience. In On Rhetoric, Aristotle explains, “authors should compose without being 
noticed” in order to temper suspicion from the audience (3.2.4). By keeping an agenda or need 
from an audience concealed, the rhetor hides their true intention in order to appear authentic and 
sincere to their audience. This concealment, ironically, builds trust between the rhetor and 
audience. When an audience feels like someone wants something from them, they are less likely 
to trust what is being said, giving way to suspicion. Suspicion causes an audience to question the 
motives and character of the rhetor, sparking a refusal to trust—leaving the rhetor unconcealed. 
When we watch someone give a speech, the dynamic of the relationship positions an audience 
member as an observer. This relationship is different on social media platforms because the 
platforms can give an illusion of participation. Liking a post, reposting a post, and following 
people feels active, participatory. This is where students—and most social media consumers—
may begin to feel confused about the types of relationships they cultivate on platforms where 
users cultivate followings.  
Think of the Insta-influencer as the rhetor, the persuasive force trying to win over an 
audience. Just like political rhetors, influencers have to build trust in order to retain their 
following and ultimately their ability to commodify their following. To avoid audience-follower 
suspicion, the influencer shares personal stories, glimpses of their life, invites the audience in to 
what would otherwise be a concealed world. The idea of inviting someone in invokes Roberts-
Miller’s dissection of public disagreement, which she says, “concerns three stases: group 
identity…, need…, and what level of punishment to enact against the out group” (“Democracy” 
33). The “group identity” stasis concerns “who is in the in-group, what signifies out-group 
membership, and how loyal rhetors are to the in-group” ( 33). By inviting followers in to their in-
group, the influencer seems to give access to their world. Different types of images can make up 
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an influencer’s world-building, giving an allusion of access: old family photos and selfies 
alongside sponsored advertising and political promotion (see Figure 3). These images and 
captions create an appearance of sincerity and openness. Such posts, however, are signifiers of 
an in-group identity where the influencer is the charismatic leader of a picture-perfect echo 
chamber.  
 
Figure 3. Kendall Jenner Instagram screen capture from Feb. 2016 
 A charismatic leader, a being perceived as almost magical, becomes a proxy for the 
follower’s self—that is, followers of a charismatic leader see themselves in the leader. In extreme 
situations of demagoguery, criticism of a charismatic leader is taken personally by the followers. 
Just as it’s nearly impossible to see oneself as a bad person, it can become inconceivable for a 
follower to see the leader as bad. Patricia Roberts-Miller identifies charismatic leaders as having 
four unique characteristics: they are perceived as superhuman; followers blindly believe leader’s 
statements; followers unconditionally comply with leaders’ directives for action (whether 
explicit or implied); and followers give the leader an unqualified emotional commitment 
(“Rhetoric” 60). As an influencer, Kendall Jenner documents an ideal reality that her followers 
aspire to inhabit. Her leadership is defined by consumerism—that is, by owning the things Jenner 
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owns, the follower can be like her, can have some of her charisma, can attain some of her magic. 
Audiences turn to influencers like Kendall Jenner (see Figure 4), for advice on everything from 
over-the-knee boots, “one of my favorites,” she writes, to facial cleansing routines, “because 
every once in a while you have to slow down” (“One;” “Because”). I’m your friend, these posts 
imply, you can be like me by buying these shoes or imitating my hygiene routine. Follower 
loyalty is demonstrated through likes, reposts, and purchases.  
 
Figure 4. Kendall Jenner Instagram screen captures from 2019 
Follower loyalty is such a normalized part of social media infrastructure that the act of 
liking, reposting, and clicking links to people’s websites may not even be thought about in the 
moment. The urge to click the like button is as innate as any other real-life reaction. When my 
friend makes a corny joke, it’s impossible for me to do anything other than roll my eyes. This 
reaction is not something I think about, but something that happens instantaneously. As someone 
scrolls through Instagram or Twitter feeds, clicking the like or reposts buttons are just as 
spontaneous. These examples contribute to the persuasive power of the rhetor. Gut-reactions, 
that is liking a post without really considering it, is reactionary rather than actively participatory. 
Usually this is innocuous, but think about when a politician like Donald Trump retweeted three 
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inflammatory and unverified anti-Muslim videos from Britain First, a far-right British 
organization. His retweets increased Islamophobic commentary on social media and elevated the 
profile of the previously fringe group of anti-Muslim activists. When asked about the retweets in 
January 2018 in an interview with Piers Morgan for Good Morning Britain, Trump said he knew 
“nothing about [Britain First] today other than I read a little bit” and if Morgan would like 
Trump to apologize he “would certainly apologize if you’d like [him] to do that” (Sharman). 
Though an extreme example of reacting on social media, public reactions on Twitter can give 
voice and legitimacy to groups or people even if you know nothing about them beyond their 
social media presence.  
Persuasion that incites in-group, out-group binaries positions demagoguery as “a savvy 
rhetorical strategy” (Roberts-Miller “Democracy” 4). Pitting one group against another—
scapegoating one group as the problems of another—becomes normal within demagogic 
discourse. Demagoguery is viral, spreading conditions of binaries and identity logics that are 
harmful to constructive conversation. There is little room for open-minded dialogue when 
identity matters more than anything else, as we can see with social media followings. The 
average Instagram user selects the accounts they choose to follow based on characteristics 
related to identity—whether it is an accurate reflection of one’s identity or aspirational. By 
following a certain account, users invite the ethos of that person into their life, allowing 
influence.  
Demagoguery frequently occurs on this kind of small scale, but small-scale demagoguery 
can lead to larger, more insidious effects that cause harm. Small-scale demagoguery is what our 
students interact with the most, causing demagoguery to feel normal in these micro-moments. 
For example, choosing who to follow and who not to follow results in a curated echo chamber of 
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identity reinforcement. Inciting in-group favoritism is a form of the genetic fallacy appeal where 
people of an in-group are considered trustworthy without merit. As Roberts-Miller explains, 
“social group membership suffices as proof” of authenticity (“Democracy” 37). Rather than 
trying to convince people to attend their festival through traditional means, Fyre sought to reach 
their audience by leveraging in-group bias and the fear of missing out (FoMO), “a pervasive 
apprehension that others might be having rewarding experiences from which one is absent” 
(Przybylski et. al 1844). Because the marketing campaign for Fyre relied on the clout of dozens 
of influencers, deemed “Fyre Starters,” the festival did not have to earn the trust of the people 
they hoped to sell tickets to—they bypassed this part of sales to leverage the trust of the 
influencer’s network.  
Influencers become intimately known by their following and their interests bleed through 
the photos and captions. Kendall Jenner’s influencer posts are a mix of sponsorship and 
supposed insight into their real life. In 2016, Jenner even used her platform to endorse Hillary 
Clinton, first in February 2016 while also promoting both Marc Jacobs and Vogue  
           
                        Jenner post February 18, 2016   Jenner post November 7, 2016 
 
Figure 5. Kendall Jenner Instagram posts from 2016 
Magazine, and then a second time on November 7th, 2016, with the caption “her her her her” 
(Jenner “Her”). This post was not only the day before the election, but just two months before  
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Figure 6. Page from Fyre Festival Promotion deck 
 
her Fyre Festival Instagram post on January 5, 2017. These posts collectively demonstrate how 
social media influence operates via demagogic logics—when a sponsored post for clothing or a 
music festival solidifies in-group membership just as much as a post of political support. This 
strategy is not dissimilar to how political influence propagates on social media platforms, as 
evidenced in the rhetoric of Jenner’s Hillary Clinton posts: if you trust Kendall Jenner, if you are 
in her in-group, then vote for Hillary Clinton. It’s a demagogic enthymeme for our digital age. 
Influencers bypass suspicion, not through classical means of seemingly spontaneous 
speeches, but through cultivated sincerity. Regarding persuasion, rhetorician Bryan Garsten 
articulates that “when we persuade, we want to change our listeners’ minds by linking our 
position to their existing opinions and emotions”—in short, we want to show our audience that 
we are on the same side, that we are a part of the same in-group (2). The easiest way to do this is 
to build friendship. Even Aristotle lauded the significant bonds of friendship, claiming that 
“when people are friends, they have no need of justice” (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.1.1155a). That 
is to say, trust exists within friendship, implicitly. A dialogue between friends does not involve 
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suspicion because trust has been formed over time. Politically speaking, friends do not need to 
win each other over or reinforce their in-group status since these are inherent to the friendship. 
Illusory friendship conceals the mechanisms of all forms of persuasion. 
Teachers of rhetoric can use the concealment of persuasion as an educational tool. 
Rhetorical media literacy pedagogy amplifies the unconcealment of demagogic conditions. 
Miller suggests a  
solution requires the unconcealment of rhetoric, the naming of the tools. Indeed, 
rhetorical education, rhetorica docens in the scholastic tradition, makes visible 
our rhetorical practice, rhetorica utens, by naming, analysis, imitation… this 
knowledge will make for citizens who can both listen critically and speak and 
write effectively… If citizens become more critical judges of rhetorical practice, 
they should also become more cunning practitioners themselves. (31-2). 
 
We “must name the tools” to enable audience awareness—students’ awareness—of persuasive 
practices in media and digital media (32). By calling for an unconcealment of rhetorical 
strategies in the classroom, Miller rightly says student-citizens will become more “cunning 
practitioners themselves,” and by illuminating the practice, a more critically attuned citizen-
audience will emerge (31). When persuading, rhetoric functions best concealed—it is easier to 
persuade someone who trusts without suspicion, as we saw with the Fyre promotions. 
Pedagogically, however, rhetoric is an analytic tool of unconcealment—by teaching students and 
citizens how to engage with media from a place of rhetorical understanding, the audience can 
make more concrete choices to trust or refuse anyone who seeks to commodify their relationship. 
A refusal to trust, through influencer or demagogue, denies both influence and power, leveling 
the dynamic between audience and rhetor or follower and influencer.  
 Media influence is a part of the Communication strand of Virginia’s eleventh grade 
English standards of learning: students will “examine how values and points of view are included 
or excluded and how media influences beliefs and behaviors” (“SOL 11.2” 271). Since the small-
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scale moments like influencer advertisements are what students most frequently interact with on 
social media, the Fyre Festival as a cultural moment can be used in the classroom to help 
students recognize how media messages influence audience behaviors.  Presented as a case study 
to evaluate source materials, the small-scale demagoguery of social media persuasion helps to 
determine authorial purpose and intended effects on an audience. With the concepts covered in 
this section, there is room to look closely at media literacy education in Virginia secondary 
English education.   
 
Oral Language to Communications in the Virginia Standards of Learning3 
 In June 1995, the Virginia Department of Education (VDOE) approved the Standards of 
Learning in four core content areas: mathematics, science, English, and history & social 
sciences. The SOLs are unique in that the state of Virginia is one of only nine states in the US 
that does not use the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) initiative. In 2010, when CCSS was 
dispersed nationwide, Virginia had already been using the SOL system for fifteen years. After 
reviewing and comparing both systems, the VDOE found the considerable time and money 
invested in developing the SOLs did not warrant a switch to a comparable system of state 
education standards.  
In general, the state of Virginia believes their SOLs are more comprehensive than the 
CCSS wherein students will “have been exposed to the same content [as CCSS] through different 
learning progressions, although there is some content in the SOL that is not covered in the 
CCSS” (“Comparison” 4). For the English SOLs there are different strands, or categories, that 
teachers focus on throughout the year. For kindergarten through 3rd grade there are three English 
 
3 I received my teaching licensure in Virginia and have taught in Virginia public schools using the SOLs, so my 
focus is on Virginia’s SOLs for the purposes of this project.   
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SOL strands: 1) Oral Language, 2) Reading, 3) Writing. For fourth grade through twelfth grade 
there are four English SOL strands: 1) Communication: Speaking, Listening, Media Literacy, 2) 
Reading, 3) Writing, 4) Research (“English Standards”). Beginning in fourth grade for the SOLs, 
the Oral Language strand changes to Communication: Speaking, Listening, and Media Literacy, 
giving communication skills its own focus through the remainder of a student’s public education. 
This is a notable distinction between the SOLs and CCSS because CCSS addresses media 
literacy as an application within the standards and does not give the subject its own emphasis.  
The VDOE does not state exactly why the shift from Oral Language in kindergarten 
through third grade to Communication in fourth grade occurs, though it may have to do with 
developmental psychologist Jean Piaget’s stages of cognitive development. From ages seven to 
nine, depending on personal development, children move from Piaget’s preoperational stage 
(generally marked as ages 2-7/8) to the concrete operational stage (generally marked as ages 8/9-
11) of cognitive development. In the preoperational stage, ending sometime during third grade, 
Piaget suggests children are limited by egocentrism, the tendency to “perceive, understand, and 
interpret the world in terms of the self,” meaning they are not yet able to understand the 
perspective of others (Miller 53 qtd in Meece & Daniels). Further, children in the preoperational 
stage begin to develop an understanding of their own mind, but have limited understanding of 
thinking processes (Meece & Daniels 142). Looking closely at the SOL standard for third grade, 
there are five standards that designate success: attentive listening, ask and respond to questions, 
explain what has been learned, use contextual language, and increase vocabulary to talk about 
listening and speaking.4 These Oral Language communication skills all fall within Piaget’s 
preoperational stage in which students are not yet expected to think beyond themselves or 
 
4 For a detailed look at the third (3.1) and fourth (4.1) grade SOLs that I discuss in this section, see Figure 1 in the 
appendix. 
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consider different perspectives from their own. Piaget’s theories combine well with the 
hierarchical model used to classify cognitive educational learning objectives developed by 
Benjamin Bloom, published in 1956 (Meece & Daniels 214). The hierarchy has six distinct 
stages that become progressively more cognitively demanding: remember→ understand→ 
apply→ analyze→ evaluate→ create. The understand stage asks students to explain ideas or 
concepts through description, discussion, explanation, and identification. The third grade SOLs 
for Oral Language fall within this understand stage of Bloom’s Taxonomy in that students’ 
primary cognitive role is to explain, summarize, and identify what has been said. 
 In fourth grade, educators in Virginia public schools are tasked with introducing a new 
strand of learning: Communication: Speaking, Listening, Media Literacy—the beginning of 
rhetorical education. The difference between what they do in this strand in fourth grade 
compared with the Oral Language strand done in kindergarten through third grade falls in line 
with what is known as metacognitive development in child psychology. Metacognition is 
thinking about thinking, or awareness of one’s own theories and opinions (Meece & Daniels 
144). This type of language is reflected in the fourth grade communication SOL, showing vastly 
different language than the previous grade’s Oral Language strand: “seek ideas and opinions of 
others, use evidence to support opinions” (“English Standards” 74). 5 Expanding the oral 
language strand to a more detailed understanding of communication by including media literacy 
challenges students to grow from the preoperational stage of cognitive development to Piaget’s 
concrete operational stage. 
The fourth grade standards ask students to present information, contribute to discussions, 
seek the opinions of others, use evidence to support opinions, communicate new ideas, and 
 
5 Refer to Figure 1 with special attention to the language of the 4.1 standards 
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demonstrate abilities to work both collaboratively and independently, all of which coincide with 
moving through Bloom’s Taxonomy. In the communication strand, students enter new stages of 
cognitive development and begin honing skills that will help them form opinions and 
perspectives on their way to adulthood. Not just asked to understand what is being said, students 
must apply information they learn to new situations by interpreting opinions and ideas of other 
people. Students analyze by drawing connections among new ideas through questioning, and 
they evaluate by justifying a stance in support of an opinion by using evidence. Students then 
create new or original work through synthesizing their opinions and evidence to develop into 
presentations and contributions to discussions (Meece & Daniels 224). The addition of the 
communications strand moves students from basic cognitive development to more advanced 
critical thinking skills for the rest of their education. 
As students progress to middle school (grades 6-8), the Communication strand is divided 
into three parts: communication and collaboration with others (6.1, 7.1, 8.1), present, listen 
critically, and express opinions in oral presentations (6.2, 7.2, 8.2), and understanding elements 
of media literacy (6.3,7.3, 8.3) (“English Standards” 141, 142, 143, 166, 167, 168, 193, 194, 
195). The three divisions progressively building upon the skills honed from the year before, 
spanning from sixth to seventh to eighth grades. In high school, though, the strand focuses on 
two areas per grade: 9th grade—oral presentations and media messages, 10th grade—
collaboration and media messages, 11th grade—oral presentations and media influence, 12th 
grade—oral presentations (group or individual) and media influence (“English Standards” 220, 
223, 247, 248, 268, 271). Common to all grade levels from fourth grade onward is the critical 
role opinions, influence, and media play in daily life. Despite the scope of the Communication 
strand, the actual teaching and implementing of media literacy in the curriculum is up to each 
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teacher. The English SOL tests do not occur every year and only explicitly cover the Reading 
and Writing strands, leaving the Communication strand out completely. Students take the reading 
SOL exam in grades 3-8 and grade 11, and they take the writing SOL in grades 8 and 11. The 
choice to include the Communications strand as a part of the yearly curriculum falls on 
individual teachers within individual departments of individual schools, but I argue it is an 
ethical choice that teachers and department administrators must make. In an ever-increasing 
digital world, media literacy can no longer be seen as separate from reading and writing literacy.  
 
Pedagogical Ethics and Knowing Students 
As teachers, the ethical obligation to our students is not to tell them what to think or 
believe, but to help “students develop an ethical approach for making decisions about how to 
believe” (Glenn 137). This reminder from rhetorician Cheryl Glenn is especially important as the 
communications strand in Virginia’s English standards of learning (SOLs) evolves from fourth 
grade through middle and high school. In sixth grade, the SOL states that students “will express 
personal opinions and come to understand not only differing points of view but also the 
differences between facts and opinions” (“English Standards” 140). The distinction between 
facts and opinions is one that we see debated ad nauseum on news channels or through political 
Twitter posts. These types of communication skills are a part of daily life in a technological 
world for people who are learning to not only discern between the two, but also develop their 
own opinions.  
Within the formulation of opinions and perspectives, an educator’s ethical obligation 
takes root. As English teachers of communication and writing, “we are always already engaged 
in the teaching of rhetorical ethics and that the teaching of writing necessarily and inevitably 
25 
 
moves us into ethical reflections and decision-making” (Duffy 230, emphasis Duffy’s). In the 
fourth grade, when students start learning to identify their own opinions and the opinions of other 
people, bias begins to form. These opinions shape who our students are and how they perceive 
the world. As students learn to put their opinions together for the act of writing they are actively 
parsing their own ethical orientations. Developing an ethical attunement is a part of a student’s 
path to aretê. 
The path to aretê, known as excellence or virtue, is done with help from a teacher or 
tutor, though the relationship today between teacher and student differs from the original 
intentions of aretê in Ancient Greece. Socrates tutored Plato, and Plato tutored Aristotle, but in 
modern society one teacher is charged with anywhere from fifteen to thirty students in a single 
classroom. Class-size, along with people’s varying experiences with technology, do not always 
guarantee that enough time is appropriately allocated to the communication strand of the English 
SOL, let alone media literacies. In high school, where students “develop media literacy by 
examining how media messages influence people’s beliefs and behaviors,” the way media 
influence is taught and the amount of time that is given to the subject is ultimately determined by 
the teacher (“English Standards” 294). This is true of any SOL strand in any classroom. Teachers 
must feel it as an important literacy component of the curriculum to dedicate time to its study. 
Media literacy is listed as the first strand of the English SOLs for a reason: nearly all 
interactions with friends, family, news, consumption, and even education involve elements of 
digital media. That is to say, digital media use feels completely normal in 2020. Despite this 
normalcy, in some contexts digital media use is seen as a mere distraction—particularly in the 
classroom where teachers are fighting for their student’s attention. However, the English SOLs 
in particular allow for digital media use to be at the forefront of classroom dialogue. By 
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embracing and centering changes in textual consumption in an English classroom, educators are 
making an ethical commitment to include media literacy frameworks as integral pieces of a 
curriculum. Educational theorist Lee Shulman elaborates on the professional responsibility 
teachers have for what their students learn: 
My point is that excellent teaching… entails an ethical and moral commitment— what I 
might call the “pedagogical imperative.” Teachers with this kind of integrity feel an 
obligation to . . .  inquire into the consequences of their work with students. (Shulman). 
 
There are ethical implications for excluding media literacy. Take online bullying as an 
example—in 2017, Harvard admissions revoked ten offers of acceptance for students who 
participated in sending each other offensive and explicit memes (Natanson). Memes are not just 
“for fun,” but can expose the ethos of the person sending the images—the meme is a proxy for 
how the sender feels and thinks about a subject. The people held accountable for the racist and 
sexually explicit memes were not the creators, but the propagators. Memes are a new form of 
text that carry weight and real-life consequences for pedagogical aretê. For the journey toward 
excellence in English education to be successful, teachers must understand how and with what 
forms of digital media students are interfacing.  
 Getting to know students is therefore an integral part of media education. While going to 
university tends to be a choice, attending K-12 schooling is compulsory for most students—they 
have to be there. Knowledge about students’ cultural background and digital literacy is a 
necessary condition for achieving aretê in terms of rhetorical media literacy. We don’t know, for 
example, who is getting enough food each day, who has a place to sleep at night, who wrote a 
#MeToo post, and the list goes on. To think intersectionally about students is to reveal “the 
multiplicity of positions that coexist in any classroom” (Glenn 131).  
Conclusion 
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 Duffy asks English educators to define teaching argument “as the teaching of claims, 
proofs, and counterarguments, [where] we are necessarily and inevitably engaged . . .  in 
practices of ethical deliberation” (238). Claims, he suggests, are invitations to make sense of 
something: proofs ask students to hold themselves accountable to providing evidence. 
Additionally, when we teach students to include counterarguments they are “considering 
seriously opinions, facts or values that contradict their own, . . .  we are asking students to inhabit 
the perspective of The Other and to open themselves to the doubts and contradictions that attach 
to any worthwhile question” (238). Argument and research papers essentially ask students to 
persuade within a set of evolving ethical parameters. Facilitating situations where students are 
asked to focus on the validity of claims, the accountability of proofs, while demonstrating 
empathy and open-mindedness in counterarguments guides students to consider the ethics of 
their persuasion. By giving them the tools to understand how ethics are a part of good, sound 
argumentation, students will be able to notice when others are not following the same guidelines 
or even if they themselves are being misled.  
 At the beginning of this chapter I recounted the story of Lauren Batchelder, Donald 
Trump, and the harm that can come from weaponized communication. Since his medium of 
choice is Twitter, Trump weaponizes the affordances of social media platforms to enact his 
verbal violence. The adage “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt 
me,” contrasts the harm children would experience with physical violence with the effects of 
verbal violence, in hopes to minimize the effects of language (Gerdes 14). Rhetorician Kendall 
Gerdes underscores that “words—and images, and symbols—can and do hurt;” indeed, 
weaponized communication can lead to real life threats and harm (14). An implied benefit of 
teaching towards aretê and ethical rhetoric is that students will become used to being held 
28 
 
accountable for the things they say while encouraged to consider differing points of view. 
Naming the tools, as Miller suggests, involves knowing the types of fallacious appeals that 
weaponized communication rely upon. Naming the tools can make it easier to hold these types of 
leaders, dynamics, and systems accountable. Encouraging students to seriously consider 
counterarguments and points of view from which they are not familiar creates at best impartial 
and observant citizens, and at worst it teaches students to be receptive and amenable to ideas 
other than their own. 
 A call to action for more media education as a response to demagoguery or prevailing 
politics is not new, but there is an urgency to understand how demagoguery functions differently 
as we get deeper into the twenty-first century than it did even thirty years ago. The small-scale 
demagoguery that has come to characterize digital landscapes is new territory in the US because 
digital citizenship on social media networks are relatively new territory considering Myspace, 
LinkedIn, Friendster (now defunct) began in 2003, Facebook in 2004, Twitter in 2006, Instagram 
in 2010, Snapchat in 2011, TikTok in 2016, with more on the horizon. A rhetorical media 
literacy pedagogy responds to the social media enclaves of identity-driven discourse that occur 
naturally within such online platforms. Preparing younger generations of students to think about 
digital spaces in critical and rhetorically sensitives ways is necessary for achieving aretê in 2020.  
 
  
29 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Misogyny and Rhetorical Listening in Writing Center Pedagogy 
In an online article for Vox during the 2016 presidential election campaign, journalist 
Ezra Klein sought to uncover what he calls “the Gap” in Hillary Clinton’s campaign. “The Gap,” 
he explains, is the disconnect between: 1) the people who work or have worked for Clinton, 2) 
their absolute trust, admiration, and loyalty to her, 3) the people who have to vote her into office, 
their distrust, uncertainty, and dislike of her. Klein interviewed dozens of current and former 
Clinton “staffers, colleagues, friends, and foes” by beginning each discussion with roughly the 
same question: “What is true about the Hillary Clinton you’ve worked with that doesn’t come 
through on the campaign trail?” (Klein). Outwardly, this seems like a difficult question to 
respond to—if the answer was clear, then wouldn’t there be a way to overcome this invisible 
disconnect? But the answers Klein received were consistent and simple: “she really listens to 
you” (Klein). She listens. 
As a line of inquiry or subfield within rhetoric and composition studies, listening is rarely 
explicitly taught or even theorized. English exams and standardized tests focus on reading and 
writing, described by rhetorician Krista Ratcliffe as “the dominant tropes for interpretive 
invention,” with speaking placing “a respectable third” and listening running “a poor, poor 
fourth” (Rhetorical Listening 18). Treating reading and writing as dominant tropes disregards the 
importance of listening in rhetoric and composition classrooms. Rhetorical listening is, in fact, “a 
trope for interpretive invention” because it initiates a stance of openness to listen for potential 
identification movement among any cultural category (age, class, nationality, history, religion, 
politics) or any cultural position (parent/child, patient/doctor, clergy/parishioner, teacher/student) 
(17). However, Clinton’s penchant for listening, for being known by her peers, allies, and even 
30 
 
enemies as an adept listener, did not garner accolades from the public. Her openness, 
characterized by her listening, was neither seen nor heard when the time came to vote her into 
presidential office in 2016. 
Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump in 2016 was in part due to a majority 47% of white 
women who voted for Trump instead of Clinton (43%) despite his “long history of misogyny, 
sexual assault, and harassment” (Pew Research Center; Manne 15).1 Philosopher Kate Manne 
suggests white women actually prop up the misogyny of the most powerful white men, which 
does “disproportionate damage of one kind: moral damage” (15). Manne’s explanation of 
misogyny begins with white men and women because it feeds directly into the moral problems of 
misogyny faced by more vulnerable women—those of other races, trans, and otherwise less 
privileged (15). To understand the function of misogyny that does moral damage, Manne gives 
an apt distinction between two definitions of misogyny. The first, what she calls the “naïve 
conception,” is a dictionary-definition-style understanding of the concept wherein “misogyny is 
primarily a property of individual misogynists who are prone to hate women qua women… either 
universally or generally” (18). In this definition, misogynists fit a specific psychological profile 
of bigotry. For the second, Manne explains that misogyny should be understood as the “system 
that operates within a patriarchal social order to police and enforce women’s subordination and 
to uphold male dominance” (33). Misogyny is not isolated to any one person, but is rather a 
“political phenomenon” of a culture that remains ideologically patriarchal (33). In other words, 
Clinton’s loss in 2016 points to the deep-rooted patriarchy of the U.S. electorate.  
Clinton’s approach to political candidacy has been noticeably different from that of any 
 
1 Immediately following the 2016 election, many exit polls (NYTimes, CNN) cited the white woman vote for Trump 
as 52-53%, an overwhelming majority. This was the narrative at the time of Manne’s writing published in December 
2017. The Pew Research Center released a more comprehensive analysis in August 2018, clarifying the numbers to 
reflect a more accurate validated voter profile post-2016 election.  
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other in the national spotlight. In 1999, during her campaign for the New York state senate, she 
went on what she called a listening tour. She did this again during the 2016 campaign. These 
tours were not the Town Hall political showcases we typically see from male presidential 
candidates because Clinton took notes and listened to the concerns of the people she hoped to 
represent. By listening, she was able to take action—invention occurred because she listened 
and, by association, was silent, allowing for others to take up space. Listening and silence work 
in tandem, and as such both have “long been gendered ‘feminine,’ as a lamentable essence of 
weakness because speaking out has long been the gendered signal of masculinity” (Glenn Silence 
and Listening 4). Clinton’s behavior did not fit into the presidential mold because of her 
distinctly feminine approach to the presidential race, which was sharply different from her male 
opponent. 
The responsibility to listen or be silent is an expectation for women, but when the 
expectation is performed on a national scale for a job of prestige and power (the presidency), the 
expectation is questioned. The Gap that Klein refers to, where one side sees Clinton’s listening 
as a positive and the other perceives it as if Clinton has something to hide, exposes a cultural and 
gendered double standard, which rhetorician Cheryl Glenn troubles by claiming that silence can 
actually “be a deliberative, positive choice” (Glenn Rhetorical Feminism 172). Silence can create 
space for others to join a conversation, just as rhetorical listening can lead to action. But listening 
and silence are weighted with cultural gender norms, particularly feminine norms of 
attentiveness where women are expected to listen or be silent as decorum. According to Manne, 
there are norms of feminine attentiveness: “when women are supposed to give everyone around 
them personal care and attention, or else they risk seeming nasty, mean, unfair, and callus” (266). 
These norms are rampant in public discourse perceptions—men and women are perceived 
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fundamentally differently according to associations of responsibilities. Essentially, a woman’s 
responsibility is to be attentive, otherwise there are social consequences. The paradox with 
Clinton occurs because she both listens and acts—her rhetorical listening approach leads to 
action in the male-centered patriarchal stratum of government. This paradox, in turn, causes 
suspicion. 
If a male candidate is seen listening in a position of openness, “his behavior seems 
normal, unremarkable, business as usual,” but the same does not hold true for female 
candidates—“her doing the same thing makes us wonder: what is she hiding?” (Manne 270). 
Manne points out that the gendered split perception of behavior works on a national scale. When 
reading about Clinton’s approach to campaigning, it is hard not to scoff at the idea of listening as 
something unique to a female candidate. Don’t all candidates listen to their constituency? In U.S. 
culture, however, “speaking is gendered as masculine and valued positively in a public forum 
while listening is gendered as feminine and valued negatively” (Ratcliffe 18). The type of 
listening used in political spaces is the style of listening Ratcliff characterizes as masculine: a 
listening “by challenging speakers to a verbal duel to determine who knows more and who is 
quicker on his feet” (21). Women, however, are conditioned to listen differently “by smiling 
nodding, asking questions, and providing encouraging verbal cues (yes, uh huh, is that right?, 
hmmm) (Ratcliffe 21). Thus, a woman’s style of listening, particularly on a national level, is 
considered suspicious because it is not directly antagonistic. Clinton engaged in the verbal 
sparring performance during debates, but she took a different approach of rhetorical listening 
during her individual tours. 
For Hillary Clinton, the exigence for her listening tours was to create new, helpful 
policies by listening with intentional openness to her constituents. Laurie Rubiner, Clinton’s 
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legislative director from 2005 to 2008, told Klein of a time she was asked to block out two hours 
on the calendar for “card-table time.” Alongside two card tables, two huge suitcases were opened 
to reveal newspaper clippings, position papers, and random scraps. On her tours and travels, 
Clinton stuffed notes from her conversations and readings into the suitcases to be organized and 
picked through with her staff every few months. According to Rubiner, these notes “really did 
lead to legislation” because she took these conversations seriously and made her team follow up 
(Klein). Clinton’s campaign to fight opiate addiction, for example, the first and most 
comprehensive of the candidates in the 2016 presidential campaign, was the direct result of 
hearing about the issue on her tour (Klein). By listening rhetorically with openness to Other 
identities, Clinton enacted interpretive invention through legislative moves. 
Rhetorical listening is a feminist approach to leadership and mentoring, one that combats 
misogyny head on by denying force, prioritizing other points of view, and demonstrating care. 
Rhetorical listening rebuffs the persistence of misogynist interactions and hierarchy. Like 
demagoguery, misogyny functions on an everyday level that is impactful on a global scale. 
Through the ongoing threat of various types of punishment, misogyny operates implicitly 
through gendered perceptions and expectations for feminine performances. Such implicit 
preservations of misogyny normalize the internalization of misogyny, leading to serious damage. 
In the sections that follow, I craft the arete necessary to address the insidious and widespread 
nature of contemporary misogyny. I craft this arete by drawing from what writing centers can 
teach us about feminist spaces, mentoring, and feminine styles of rhetorical listening.  
 
Feminist Aretȇ 
 In the introduction, I discussed the concept of aretȇ in Homer’s Iliad where Achilles was 
trained by Chiron and Phoenix—here, through Homer, the mythos of mentoring began. He 
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continues his exposition of mentoring in his second epic, Odyssey, where a woman, the Greek 
goddess Athena, serves as the original model for mentoring as we know it in practice today. 
Athena, goddess of both wisdom and warfare, transforms herself into Mentor, a close and trusted 
friend to Odysseus. During her transformation, she advises Odysseus’ son, Telemachus, to set 
out on a quest to find his long-missing father. Athena-as-Mentor instructs Telemachus on whom 
to meet, where to go, what to say, and how to behave during his quest. Through Athena-as-
Mentor, the concept of mentorship and mentoring took root. This feminine version of the origins 
of mentorship differs from the long tradition of the master-apprentice model that was used for 
ages by men. Patriarchal mentoring was rooted in the service of the state for warfare and later in 
service of the self through philosophical and rhetorical education. But the concept of mentorship 
has its origins in Athena-as-Mentor, a woman.  
In other words, the quest and journey towards aretȇ was shaped by a feminine mythos. I 
want to posit, then, that using a specifically feminist rhetorical pedagogy can reclaim mentorship 
towards arete as a feminine style of practice. Feminist rhetorician Cheryl Glenn itemizes three 
specific ways to enact feminist mentoring as a tactic of rhetorical feminism. The first is for the 
mentor to actively “diverge from masculinist forms of mentoring,” the second is for the mentor 
to acknowledge that she resides in the center, the mentee in the margins, and the third is for the 
mentor to create the basis for a “mutually trusting relationship” with the mentee (150). These 
three feminist mentoring tenants can produce arete in pedagogical contexts that continue to be 
limited by a white, masculinist hegemony—one that we can actively witness during national 
campaigns.  
Nowhere is it more clear that misogyny and patriarchal expectations reign than during 
election seasons. To return to the example of Hillary Clinton, just why exactly was Ezra Klein’s 
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article for Vox needed in the first place? Why did the public, or at least Vox’s readership, need to 
be told about Clinton’s practice of listening and the benefits of listening? The ‘question’ of her 
likability was all news headlines seemed to be interested in leading up to the election. A quick 
Google search showed headlines from The Hill, December 2015, “Is Hillary Clinton Likable 
Enough,” from The Washington Post, May 2016, “Hillary Clinton has a likability problem. 
Donald Trump has a likability epidemic;” and from Time, May 2016, “Is Hillary Clinton Likable 
Enough?” (Parnes; Cillizza; Newton-Small). The same types of headlines followed Elizabeth 
Warren during her primary campaign: from Politico, December 2018, “Warren Battles the 
Ghosts of Hillary” and from Vox, January 2019, referencing both Warren and Kamala Harris, 
“‘Likability’ Ratings in a Recent New Hampshire Poll Show Just How Tough Female 
Candidates Have It” (Korecki, Nilsen). 
Female candidates are always already a threat to misogynistic systems. By choosing to 
approach campaigning from a stance of rhetorical listening, for instance, Hillary Clinton defied 
the masculinist forms of campaign structure. If we look at Clinton as a mentor, she fulfilled all 
three methods of Glenn’s rhetorical feminist approach by actively “diverg[ing] from masculinist 
forms of mentoring” and carving her own, lateral approach to campaigning. By centering 
rhetorical listening practices, she acknowledged that her influence and power place her in the 
center with her constituency at the margins. Listening creates an openness that equalizes. That is, 
by showing interest and concern towards her constituency, she did not create a hierarchical 
structure that placed her at the top, but rather created a level, equal means of communication. 
Finally, by implementing rhetorical listening practices, Clinton was able to amplify the voices of 
her constituency. Card-table time allowed Clinton to move through her notes and create a plan of 
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action that would lead to tangible outcomes. In these ways, Clinton’s feminine style of leadership 
actively combats large-scale misogynist influence.  
Just as Hillary Clinton’s use of rhetorical listening is her way of combating misogynist 
norms, so, too, can a rhetorical feminist pedagogy empower educators to combat the patriarchal 
and misogynist norms that might otherwise impede a student’s quests for aretȇ. In a digital age 
where media perpetuates stereotypes, a feminist mentoring methodology can work in the service 
of individual student aretȇ. Indeed, addressing micro forms of misogyny and patriarchal control 
leads to bigger, large-scale effects in a digital consciousness.  
 In Chapter 1, I used large-scale forms of demagoguery to demonstrate an extreme, but 
the chapter essentially focused on how smaller forms of demagoguery normalize the structures 
that make large-scale demagoguery possible. Here in Chapter 2, I follow a similar structure. I 
identify the extreme of misogyny by beginning with the example of Hillary Clinton’s use of 
rhetorical listening to combat political misogyny on a large-scale. What follows is a foray into 
how feminist rhetorical practices can combat more innocuous forms of patriarchal and 
misogynist control. I extend Cheryl Glenn’s work on rhetorical feminism and mentorship to 
claim the writing center as a feminist space on a university campus, up against small-scale 
misogynist standard language ideology within the academy. As an outlier space, the writing 
center combats forms of restraint within academic language, and subsequently writing, that 
students are up against in university settings. Through feminist practices of mentorship and 
rhetorical listening the writing center becomes a refuge during a student’s quest for arete.  
 
Standard Language Ideology 
 
Status quo bias is a preference for normalcy, the way things are, the current state of 
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activity. For someone with a status quo bias, the baseline of status quo is their reference point 
and difference from that baseline is a loss. This bias can affect small and large-scale decision 
making because it relies on a preference for things to stay the same or for standing by previously 
made choices that have worked in the past. Largely, the status quo feels safe and comfortable 
because it is popular, safe, and known, whereas deterrents to the status quo are considered 
disruptive outliers. In education, teachers often teach towards the status quo because past 
experiences shape teachers’ views of what constitutes good teaching. A fixture in educational 
status quo bias is standard language ideology (SLI): 
a bias toward an abstracted, idealized, homogenous spoken language which is imposed 
and maintained by dominant bloc institutions and which names as its model the written 
language but which is drawn primarily from the spoken language of the upper middle 
class (Lippi-Green 67). 
 
Language ideologies in education are formed and influenced by positioning the language of 
high-level education as a more advanced, complex version of English. For teachers of language, 
relying on the status quo for consistency is the safe, comfortable choice because SLI is an 
inherent part of the American mainstream—it is what is spoken on the news, radio, and 
television, within political, educational, professional settings. Standard language ideology has 
become the default status quo for how to speak as an American. 
Standardized English and the idea of a standard language ideology represent a very 
specific and exclusive sector of the population. For my purposes, SLI is the language of the 
academy and associated with certain types of success. Not only is SLI the norm, but academic 
institutions also maintain the notion that a standard the only acceptable norm for writing in an 
academic setting. In academic settings that claim to welcome diversity in student population, 
there is a noticeable disconnect when considering standard language ideology in the academy 
and expectations for academic writing. 
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The patriarchal approach to academic writing within university and academic settings 
aligns with Manne’s definition of misogyny as a function of patriarchal social order: misogyny 
polices social participants in order to uphold and reinforce basic and extreme forms of 
dominance over women (33). The logic of this dominance similarly affects academic writing in 
that academic language often marginalizes Others—the perpetuation of academic language as a 
static, standardized set of rules furthers biases against race, socioeconomic status, and 
educational backgrounds. In an opinion piece published in The New York Times, literary theorist, 
scholar, and proponent of SLI, Stanley Fish claims standard English is “an instrument of power 
and a device for protecting the status quo” (Fish part 3). It is important to note, though, that Fish 
has made his living off of standard language ideology as a member of the status quo (a white, 
heterosexual male with both an elite education and an elite position of power at an array of top 
tier universities).  
 When scholars, academics, and those with power in academic settings act as though SLI 
is the only option for academic writing, they ignore the diverse forms students’ aretȇ can take. 
Some thinkers seem to realize SLI might not support every student, and yet they cling to it as a 
dominant paradigm anyway. Stanley Fish, for example, advocates perpetuating SLI as a form of 
empowerment for Others: 
you’re not going to be able to change the world if you are not equipped with the tools that 
speak to its present condition. You don’t strike a blow against a power structure by 
making yourself vulnerable to its prejudices (Fish).  
 
However, this sort of reasoning is a logical fallacy, circular reasoning, in which the proposition 
looks like an argument, but is really just an assertion of the conclusion (Roberts-Miller 109). The 
evidence—one cannot change the world—is only valid if Fish’s conclusion is true—one must be 
equipped with the standardized language tools to enact change. Fish assumes standard English is 
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the only “tool” that can enact change upon the world, marginalizing all other dialects. This 
assumption “nullifies a vernacular, a personal experience, an emotion” of Fish’s audience—
mentees, students—limiting productivity of the relationship between educator/mentor and 
student/mentee, and ultimately threatening a student’s aretȇ (Glenn 153).  
In order to progress in higher education, especially through graduate school and working 
towards tenure, there is an assumed white, middle-class knowledge implicitly understood by 
enfranchised students and professors (Glenn 160). The patriarchal system of the academy does 
not cater well to those outside of this perceived norm. Lippi-Green elaborates that “when 
histories are written, they focus on the dominant class” (8).2  History is written in the voice of 
those in power, of those with power and resources to control and distribute information. 
Language prejudice happens “when folks dont get no jobs or get fired or whatever cuz they talk 
and write Asian or black or with an Appalachian accent or sound like whatever aint the status 
quo” (Young 110). Language and racial difference are intertwined, according to rhetorician and 
language studies scholar Vershawn Ashanti Young, and both are reinforced by patriarchal 
ideologies that allow for only one outcome to dominate.  
Standard language ideology is a problem for disrupters and outliers of the academic 
status quo. In particular, SLI is a problem for the feminist writing center space on university 
campuses. While writing centers aim to serve all students of their university campus, the students 
who are most likely to visit are those who do not align with the status quo. As such, the writing 
center, an outlier space, does not support SLI because it actively works to promote individual 
student voice in writing assignments through feminist mentorship and rhetorical listening. 
 
 
2 Lippi-Green attributes this statement to Kwame Nkrumah, former president of Ghana and father of the pan-
national African movement. She says the phrase is widely paraphrased as “histories are written by the victors” (24). 
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Feminist Mentoring at the Writing Center 
The writing center at VCU operates under the principle that students learn and think best 
through direct social interaction with other people. When discussing writing center operations in 
workshops, we explain that the consultations are collaborative: students do not come to a 
consultation, hand over their paper to a consultant, and wait for feedback. Rather, consultants 
actively engage and listen to the student. Conversation, Kenneth Bruffee claims, is “the origin of 
thought” because conversation stimulates reflective and critical though. People learn in “direct 
social exchange with other people” (208). Learning to write and develop writing skills is 
optimized when it becomes part of a social thinking and learning process. 
Social interaction helps writing centers define and distinguish their spaces in relation to 
the classroom experience. In this distinction, the writing center reflects Glenn’s feminist 
mentoring by actively “diverging from masculinist forms of mentoring” (150). The writing 
center rebuffs the hierarchical order of the classroom and the masculinist form of traditional top-
down mentoring “between like-minded men of different ages” (Glenn 151). To support a 
student’s quest for aretȇ, feminist mentorship centers collaboration, reciprocity, and 
connection—all vital components that set a writing center space noticeably apart from other 
academic spaces on campus.  
Furthering this divergence, writing centers disavow the idea of a solitary author. Where 
the typical classroom assignment imagines the student as a singular, solitary author, in the 
writing center, the student is not isolated with his or her own ideas. Rhetorician Marilyn Cooper 
presents the idea of “the solitary author” as someone who “sees his writing as a goal-directed 
piece of work, the process of producing a text” (Ecology 366). Educators often frame their 
students in these terms; even authors of composition textbooks approach their student audiences 
41 
 
in this way. But Cooper suggests that classes can escape the “tyranny” of the solitary author 
paradigm by developing an ecology of writing in “which students engage in group work, 
activities such as collaborative brainstorming on a topic, discussions and debates of topics or 
readings, writers reading their texts aloud to others, writers editing other writers’ texts” (Ecology 
366). In fact, writing consultations demonstrate Cooper’s ecological approach because students 
manage their writing by talking through their writing process, their ideas, and their approach to 
writing. At the writing center, writing is not seen in terms of an end product, but as an active 
reflection, deliberation, and dialogue that precedes and coincides with the formal writing 
process.  
By engaging with writing as a social process, the writing center consultant learns the 
student’s perspective about their own writing voice. Personal, authorial voice is a challenge for 
students to take ownership of, especially when people like Stanley Fish promote an idea that 
some ways of writing make students “vulnerable to prejudice” (Fish). Young enacts performance 
to demonstrate how standard language ideology removes all understanding of the mentee’s 
personal identity: “dont nobody’s language, dialect, or style make them ‘vulnerable to 
prejudice’... It be the way folks with some power perceive other people’s language . . .  Black 
English dont make it own-self oppressed” (110). When it comes to standard language ideology, 
the people in positions of power have developed a standard to which they expect everyone to 
conform. But this standard is the default dialect for the people with the power—that is, those 
whose voice is defaulted as the norm do not experience the persecution and prejudice felt by 
those whose voice is othered.  Marginalized students who are unfamiliar with writing in the 
standardized, default voice of the academy come to the writing center worried their papers do not 
sound good enough, smart enough, or academic enough. Through the social process of writing 
42 
 
consultations, writing consultant-mentors help students navigate the power dynamics of control 
over one’s own writing voice.  
Stanley Fish’s opinion piece exemplifies the power of the center in that it was published 
by The New York Times, giving him an enormous audience. His articles have mainstream 
distribution, which in itself is powerful. When someone like Stanley Fish, who is coming from 
an academically privileged point of view, tells a large audience that language dialect or style is a 
problem, he both creates and affirms language bias’ stronghold in and outside of academia, 
bolstering a dominant and standardized language ideology. The academy, and professors, hold 
similar, though smaller-scale forms power over the type of language use a student can employ. 
The writing center consultant-as-mentor works against these patriarchal controls.  
The consultant-as-mentor holds a unique position as both being a student-peer, but also 
someone who understands the controls of the academy due to the nature of their position. That is, 
the writing consultant is privy to the controls of both worlds, navigating both the academic status 
quo and the outlier nature of writing centers.  Thus, the consultant, as mentor, does as Glenn 
suggests when employing feminist mentoring. The consultant acknowledges their position as 
“residing in the center, the mentee in the margins,” and brings the student-mentee in to the center 
by empowering and amplifying their voice (and control) over their own writing (Glenn 
Rhetorical Feminism 150).  
When the policing of language dictates how students convey their writing, students feel 
disenfranchised, as if they do not have ownership over their own work. Cooper suggests writing 
consultants can best help students achieve agency as writers 
by helping them understand how and the extent to which they are not owners of their 
texts; by helping them understand, in short, how various institutional forces impinge on 
how and what they write and how they can negotiate a place for their own goals and 
needs when faced with these forces. (Useful Knowledge 101) 
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Here, Cooper makes clear that agency in writing does not depend on ownership of the writing, 
but on constructing a point of view or position within the writing. This method correlates with 
Glenn’s enhanced rhetorical feminist practice of bringing the mentee into the center on their 
quest for aretȇ. To achieve agency and, by default, excellence in writing, consultants help 
students find and negotiate the space between institutional demands and individual needs for an 
assignment—thus bridging the gap between center and margin. Consultants by “virtue of their 
constant contact with institutional constraints and with students’ lived experiences,” are best 
positioned to empower students as agents of their own writing (Really Useful Knowledge 102). 
 The unique position of writing center consultants converges as the means for mutual 
learning, aligning with feminist pedagogy in an inventive way that traditional classroom 
interactions do not allow. Feminist mentor-consultants demonstrate their commitment to 
“equality of underrepresented groups and to reciprocity of engagement” as a disruption to the 
status quo (Glenn Rhetorical Feminism 150). The consultant is not a traditional authority within 
the patriarchal academic structure; their authority and expertise derive from other interactions 
with students in consultations, personal interactions with professors as a student (the consultant 
is an undergraduate or graduate student herself), and an engagement with the institution’s 
function as a patriarchal system. In this way, consultants are supports for the aretȇ quest by 
empowering the students they meet.  
 
Rhetorical Listening 
 Tutoring methods that promote mutual learning and collaboration enable invention and 
engagement. The student arrives with the exigence for their meeting, but despite being student-
centered, the consultant’s role is to provide a focus for the session based on the stage of the 
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writing process the student inhabits. To support students as agents of their own writing, 
consultants engage in the feminist practice of rhetorical listening. Just as Hillary Clinton was 
able to enact change by listening to her constituency, so are writing consultants better able to 
support the needs of their student-mentees by using rhetorical listening. Feminist pedagogical 
practices like rhetorical listening are well suited for writing center spaces. A rhetorical listening 
approach alleviates the agonistic interactions that can occur with someone on the margins of a 
hierarchical, patriarchal institution. The writing center, invariably, is a contact zone on the 
university campus where two strangers meet and engage in a way that is both amiable and 
generative. We can learn from this model in continuing to address agonism’s legacy in both 
demagoguery and misogyny. 
 To engage with strangers productively, the goal of rhetorical listening is to enter 
situations with “a stance of openness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any 
person, test, or culture” (Ratcliffe 17). But that “stance of openness” cannot occur without 
negotiating and critically interrogating “the existing (mis)perceptions about [race and gender] 
and their intersections” (135). That is, writing consultants must avoid exacerbating or promoting 
gender-blindness and color-blindness during meetings with students because these styles of 
engagement reinforce the status quo. For men, gender-blindness means denying the privilege that 
is associated with being male in U.S. culture, while for women it means accepting male privilege 
as normal or natural. Acceptance of misogyny makes women feel as if their existence as female 
is a problem that needs to be solved. In U.S. culture the same goes for white people—color-
blindness means denying the privilege that comes with whiteness and also denying the 
differences of other races. For anyone who is not white, color-blindness means being made to 
feel race is a problem for she or he alone to solve (134). Had Stanley Fish acknowledged the 
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privilege associated with his gender and race, his New York Times opinion piece would have 
been read and received quite differently. He would have been unable to assert a dominant 
language ideology without recognizing and complicating the patriarchal system from which he 
benefits.  
Within a patriarchal system, listening has both gender and racial bias. Modern gendered 
listening bias stems from its origins in Socratic dialogues. The rise of rhetoric in ancient Greece 
coincided with the already thriving agonistic culture of warfare. Aretê was associated with 
physicality for the good of the state before it was associated with intellectual sparring and verbal 
debates. Masculine listening occurs through “verbal duels” and waiting to speak while feminine 
listening does not originate from the same agonism (Ratcliffe 21). A feminist approach to 
rhetorical listening, as we see with Clinton’s listening tours, is nurturing and generative. Racial 
bias in listening has a similar history to its gendered counterpart. bell hooks explains racial bias 
harms progress within feminist movements because white women are often unwilling “to listen 
to black women” (102): 
Most white women dismissed us as “too angry,” refusing to reflect critically on the issues 
raised. By the time, white women active in the feminist movement were willing to 
acknowledge racism, accountability, and its impact on the relationships between white 
women and women of color, many black women were devastated and worn out. We felt 
betrayed . . .  white women no show interest in racial issues. It seems at times as though 
white feminists working in the academy have appropriated discussions of race and racism 
while abandoning the effort to construct a space for sisterhood, a space where they could 
examine and change attitudes and behaviors toward black women and all women of 
color. (102-3) 
 
An openness through listening can lead to closing divisions, healing feelings of betrayal, or 
opening up dialogue for change and progress. When listening is dismissed, it becomes 
undervalued and can be countered with aggression. The white women to whom hooks refers 
became accusatory and dismissive when faced with the reality of racial bias within the feminist 
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movement. The reinforcement of racial bias in feminism is not a problem for Black feminists to 
solve. The white women who were closed off to understanding the Black perspective engaged in 
a misogynist shut-down of rhetorical listening and intervention, leaving the issue of racial bias 
unacknowledged and ignored.  
 Understanding the implications of these blindness biases are integral to the writing 
center’s continued role as a feminist contact zone on campus. Glenn’s method of enhanced 
feminist mentoring explains mentors are “fluent in the use of rhetorical concepts, practices, and 
deliveries, especially in the power of dialogue, silence, and listening to enhance any rhetorical 
transaction” (150). Mentors must make mutually trusting relationships with mentees, connections 
that inform mentor and mentee of each other’s views and experiences. A shared commitment to 
understanding each other’s point of view stems from rhetorical listening—it is really the only 
way to effectively support a student’s quest to aretȇ. Too often the academy will assume a 
certain level of comfort in an academic space, even assuming an investment in the patriarchal 
status quo. But students gain agency through expression of their own identity (their gender, their 
race, their voice, their cultural capital) in their own way— at the writing center, student 
empowerment occurs when modes of writing and speaking beyond standard language ideology 
are not diminished. Gender and race are parts of a student’s identity, carried with them at all 
times.  Writing center scholar Harry Denny refers to these pieces of identity as “cultural capital” 
that doesn’t “translate easily for us in the academy” (103). Rhetorical listening practices support 
bringing awareness to gender and racial bias and difference. In consultations, it is possible to 
actually hear difference and promote productive communication cross-culturally. 
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Conclusion 
Trust is not easily cultivated. In the first chapter, I explored how social media influencers 
cultivate trust with their following to supplant the personal relationships that are built through 
friendship. In our current digital age, students engage in mentorship through networks, whether 
face to face mentorship, like at the writing center, or online in digital spaces, or a combination of 
the two. In a 2014 study, social scientists studied traditional adult-youth mentoring programs and 
their use of social media in developing relationships. The study showed “media use does not 
seem to detract from the closeness and quality of face-to-face mentoring relationships, but may 
actually supplement and strengthen them” (Schwartz 212). That is, in rhetorical feminist 
mentoring practice, social media can enhance the collaboration and connection between mentor 
and mentee. In a social digital network, students achieve aretê by finding exemplars to serve as 
mentors. 
One path to aretê does not look the same for everyone, but achieving aretê hinges on 
finding a mentor or exemplar as a part of the journey. Rhetorician John Gallagher explains 
“certain kinds of people, namely exemplars, illustrate” qualities that lead to happiness in 
classical virtue ethics (380). In order to enact virtue ethics, especially within academia, a student 
must find someone who exemplifies virtues that foster their aretê. Using Twitter, for example, a 
mentor acts as an exemplar for how academics should write, behave, and interact on a 
widespread, public social media platform. Ethics philosopher Linda Zagzebski characterizes 
exemplars as “those persons who are most imitable, and they are most imitable because they are 
most admirable” (52). Using social media platforms for professional exposure and connection 
can be extremely intimidating to new scholars, particularly if their social media use in the past 
has been mostly between family and friends. Navigating the online world with a professional 
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lens is quite different, but a digitally-versed rhetorical feminist mentor can model a healthy 
social media presence that can lead to fruitful benefits.  
Academic Twitter, a hashtag (#AcademicTwitter) that scholars use on Twitter’s platform 
to signify an in-group of those involved in higher-education, encourages collaboration and 
discussion between academics and scholars. Twitter is no longer an optional service for most 
academics, but a means to furthering scholarship, announcing employment opportunities, sharing 
work (and in-turn finding collaborators for work), and joining in on conversations beyond the 
norm at one’s own institution. For mentor-mentee relationships, Twitter can act as a way to 
practice feminist mentoring. To bring mentees in to the center that the mentor occupies, the 
mentor can tag or post accomplishments of the mentee. For example, if a mentee gives a 
conference presentation, the mentor can celebrate the mentee’s success online, while also 
promoting the mentee to a new group of academics who might take interest in her scholarship. 
Further, the mentee might write a tweet about a cause she is interested in, alerting the mentor to 
an aspect of the mentee that had been previously unknown. In this way Twitter can act as a 
mediated form of rhetorical listening in a mentoring relationship.  
The Academic Twitter network functions as an exemplar for achieving aretê. The 
hashtag #AcademicTwitter brings scholars together to inform the community at large about their 
research—a tool for networking in academia that is hard to match face-to-face. Increasingly, 
Twitter usage has become a must-have for those on the job market with one’s Twitter handle as 
important to a CV as an email address. The Academic Twitter network enables users to share 
content that fits within an intellectual and personal brand, positioning oneself as an exemplar of 
their field. In this way, Academic Twitter-as-exemplar facilitates the quest for aretê, leading 
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mentees to configure the professional and personal in a public forum by learning from the 
collective network.  
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CODA 
Post-Truth and Social Media 
 The need for rhetorical media literacy is more urgent than ever as reliance on social 
media networking and connections becomes intertwined with everyday life in the U.S. While 
there was much to be learned from the 2016 election, as digital citizens we can consider the ways 
we use social media as part of our daily lives. It’s important for young people to think critically 
about how they choose to use social media, but it’s also important for those of us who did not 
grow up with social media platforms at our fingertips to become more educated and sensitive 
about what we consume online, particularly when considering political use of social media. For 
online-based political marketing, campaigns cull thousands of pieces of data on just one 
individual. This data tells a campaign marketer an individual’s demographics and interests that 
enables a political campaign to mimic the type of concerns that would be discussed by friends in 
targeted advertising. Trust built between friends is a commodity that political campaigns hope to 
emulate because a friend’s endorsement of a political candidate represents more than just an 
affinity for the candidate. Endorsing a candidate on the Facebook platform aligns the friend (or 
family member) with the candidate’s views and opinions, and serves as a signal of the friend’s 
personal set of virtues. Often one friend’s set of virtues impact those of another friend. How 
people use and navigate social media speaks directly to how personal virtues are formed, how 
one pursues aretê, and how one might influence the aretê quest of others. 
 There are forces along the quest to aretê that can mislead and persuade under the guise of 
being an exemplar. Political advertising campaigns are one such force. Like social media 
influencers, political campaigns hope to sell an ideal that ultimately does not benefit a person’s 
pursuit of aretê, despite acting as a trusted exemplar. Political campaigns fuel constituencies’ 
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allegiance to an in-group for the benefit of the political candidate the campaign represents. 
Online political marketing campaigns in particular are created to bring in members (or solidify 
membership) to the political in-group while ostracizing others to an out-group. On social media 
platforms like Facebook, campaign advertisements can home in on target audiences. This 
attention to specific, targeted groups of people is called micro-targeting. By compiling data 
points with the types of people who comprise their constituency, campaign advertising targets 
specific sub-groups of the larger in-group following. Republican National Committee officials 
say they have “invested over $300 million into their data operation since [the 2012 election] and 
have collected roughly 3,000 data points on every voter in the country in a system jointly owned 
by the Trump campaign and the RNC” (Broderick). Three thousand data points on each 
individual person is an enormous amount of information and enables campaigns to micro-target 
specific types of voters.   
The large amount of data tells campaign marketers how to tweak their messages based on 
more than location and gender—with three thousand data points marketers speak directly to 
specific people to enact an agenda. Micro-targeted advertising allows candidates to cater to 
smaller demographics of people with personalized messaging as if they were a friend, mentor, or 
exemplar. In an article for The Atlantic, McKay Coppins explains the advantages of micro-
targeted ads: 
 An ad that calls for defunding Planned Parenthood might get a mixed response from a 
large national audience, but serve it directly via Facebook to 800 Roman Catholic women 
in Dubuque, Iowa, and its reception will be much more positive. 
 
A specific ad created for a specific group of people feels small at first. How do 800 people make 
or break an election? The strategy, though, is to reach small groups of people hundreds and 
thousands of times over. The small forms of persuasion, coaxing, whispering from a candidate 
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who speaks directly to an in-group are not isolated events. From June to November 2016, 
Trump’s campaign dominated the Facebook advertising market, running 5.9 million ads 
compared to Hillary Clinton’s 66,000 (Frier). The onslaught of advertising does more than 
validate in-group supporters—it also seeks to ostracize those in the out-group.  
Micro-targeted advertising in this way is partially responsible for voter suppression—a 
tactic used to shrink an opposing electorate rather than expand a constituency base. This is a part 
of the ploy to solidify in-group membership rather than trying to create more in-group members. 
It is easier to reinforce beliefs than it is to convert someone’s beliefs. During Trump’s 2016 
campaign, strategists created ads using clips from 1996 when Hillary Clinton called some 
African American males “super predators” during a speech delivered at Keene State University 
(CSPAN). These ads were created specifically to discourage black voters from showing up to the 
polls (Green). Persuasion in the noise of millions of advertisements becomes less about 
concentrating on new ideas and more about motivation through confirmation bias. If Trump’s 
campaign can convince an African American population in Florida that Hillary Clinton 
is/was/has always been a racist, then the motivation to vote for her or Trump (who has also said 
racist things) eliminates the need or desire to vote in the first place. The feeling of hopelessness 
when comparing candidates is disorienting for voters and obstructs an aretê quest. Sowing 
confusion is more likely to benefit political campaigns than taking the time to negotiate with 
dissenting voices from an out-group.  
An abundance of information and advertising—advertising that is meant to satisfy and 
confirm one’s in-group membership and identity—can be disorienting. Trump’s social media 
coordinator Brad Parscale is responsible for Trump’s campaign tactics to shut down “dissenting 
voices . . .  to harness the democratizing power of social media . . .  [by] using a megaphone to 
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drown [them] out” (Coppins). Journalist Peter Pomerantsev calls this “censorship through noise” 
(27). The “noise” is mass amounts of information that cause people to question what they 
consider to be true, or to just not care anymore about whether information is true in the first 
place. A candidate's political narrative can be one of fact or fiction. According to a political 
science study, exposure to fact-checking may reduce misperceptions among supporters of 
political candidates, but it will not necessarily change a voter’s mind about whom to support 
(Nyhan 4). Matters of fact, therefore, are less important than in-group identity confirmation.  
While the creators of the advertisements are one part of the information overload that 
exists on personal social media news feeds and dashboards, the second part is those who share 
the information. The reason why three thousand data points are needed to target one small group 
of people is because cultivating trust is hard. Advertising on Facebook works because the 
platform is set up as a network of friends and family members where trust is implicit. A friend or 
family member who shares a political advertisement post for Trump, for example, is 
acknowledging their support for Trump, sharing with their followers a badge of in-group 
membership to the ideology of Trump’s persona. It is easier to unfollow or hide posts of said 
family member if you disagree—just as it is easier to like or share the post if you agree—than it 
is to express disgust with the advertisement’s narrative in the comments. Unfollowing and hiding 
posts from people with opposing opinions is a way to manage the chaos of information. But this 
also signifies one’s personal virtues. What does it mean to not engage with differing opinions? 
What does it mean if I confront? What does it mean for my aretê quest to hide or unfollow those 
with whom I disagree? What does it mean for me to keep the people I disagree with visible on 
my newsfeed? Journalist Sean Illing suggests that by leaning more into the “narratives that strip 
the world of its complexity” we reinforce our biases, creating a narrower and more isolated echo 
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chamber (“Post-truth Prophets”). Social media use, in the beginning of what will be a long 
history of online political campaigning, asks users to confront their personal virtues head on. Do 
I want to live in a bubble of my own making on social media? Do I want to create an isolated 
echo chamber or is part of my aretê journey opening myself up to differing views? Aretê is not a 
simple, straight line, and the challenges presented by digital media persuasion complicate the 
quest.  
 Rhetorical media literacy education is a step towards building an awareness of how we 
are using social media. Our social media platform of choice reflects a personalized narrative of 
our identity. Both who one follows and who one does not follow reflect who a person is and who 
a person wants to be—we’re “authors of our own universes” (Illing). There is value in 
acknowledging one’s own confirmation bias in constructing a social media echo chamber. When 
a writer creates a universe, she knows the confines of that world—she knows what will make 
that world prosper and she knows what types of villains would disrupt the peace of her created 
universe. Political campaign advertisements that micro-target seek to undermine individuals 
personal, created universes. Armed with millions of dollars and thousands of data points, 
political demagogues want to creep in and disrupt personalized digital ecosystems. The existence 
of personalized social media echo chambers is not going anywhere—with each new iteration of 
social networking applications, the reality of their longevity becomes more clear. Rhetorical 
media literacy is a defense against the intruders of our created universes. By arming ourselves 
with awareness of the noise and of bias, it becomes more possible to fortify an attack or a barrier 
against the interlopers on the quest to aretê. 
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APPENDIX 
Third Grade: “Oral Language” Fourth Grade: “Communication: Speaking 
Listening, Media Literacy” 
Standard 3.1: The student will use effective 
communication skills in group activities. 
a) Listen attentively by making eye contact, 
facing the speaker, asking questions, and 
summarizing what is said. 
b) Ask and respond to questions from teachers 
and other group members. 
c) Explain what has been learned. 
d) Use language appropriate for context. 
e) Increase listening and speaking vocabularies. 
 
Standard 4.1: The student will use effective oral 
communication skills in a variety of settings.  
a) Present accurate directions to individuals and 
small groups. 
b) Contribute to group discussions across content 
areas.  
c) Seek ideas and opinions of others. 
d) Use evidence to support opinions. 
e) Use grammatically correct language and 
specific vocabulary to communicate ideas. 
f) Communicate new ideas to others. 
g) Demonstrate the ability to collaborate with 
diverse teams. 
h) Demonstrate the ability to work 
independently. 
Understanding the Standard (Teacher Notes): 
● The intent of this standard is that students will 
communicate effectively during discussions in 
group settings. 
● Students will interact with group members by 
asking and responding to questions and 
explaining what has been said or learned. 
● Teacher should provide opportunities for 
students to develop skills for both speaking 
(expressive) and listening (receptive) 
vocabulary (e.g., have one student read a 
paragraph that is rich in descriptive detail 
aloud to a partner or group of students. Those 
students then draw the scene as they listen.).  
Understanding the Standard (Teacher Notes):  
● The intent of this standard is that students will 
continue to develop the skills needed to 
communicate in a variety of settings. 
● Students will strengthen their communication 
skills by contributing to individual and small-
group discussions, seeking the ideas and 
opinions of others and beginning to use 
evidence to support their own personal 
opinions. 
● Students will also refine the skill of conveying 
accurate directions to individuals or small 
groups in such a way that others can follow 
the directions. Emphasis will be on directions 
for doing things that have a natural sequence 
or organization.  
Essential Understandings:  
All students should:  
● Participate effectively in group activities by 
using language appropriate for the context and 
by taking turns in conversations and moving 
group discussions forward. 
● Increase listening and speaking vocabularies. 
Essential Understandings:  
All students should: 
● Participate effectively in discussions by: 
○ Asking clarifying questions; 
○ Providing explanations when 
necessary; 
○ Reflecting on the ideas and opinions 
of others; 
○ Supporting opinions with examples 
and details 
● Demonstrate an ability to work independently 
and in small groups.  
Figure 7. Virginia SOLs Comparison of 3.1 and 4.1 
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